Abstract-In this paper, a control methodology based on the hyperbolic absolute risk averse (HARA) utility function is presented as an alternative to the exponential-of-an-integral approach to finding robust controllers. This work is inspired by the intuition that HARA controllers, while being robust, may give better performance than exponential controllers in normal situations. The HARA problem is shown to be equivalent to a certain differential game, and the asymptotic properties of the HARA problem and this differential game are studied. As an example, a linear-quadratic HARA problem is studied, where the problem of finding a robust HARA controller is proved to be equivalent to solving a standard linear-quadratic problem for a system with a higher noise intensity. This reveals an interesting relationship between robustness and uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N THIS PAPER, we propose an approach based on the hyperbolic absolute risk averse (HARA) utility function [ , for and ] as an alternative to the exponential utility [ , for ] approach to finding robust controllers. This work is inspired by the intuition that HARA controllers, while being robust, may perform better than exponential controllers when applied to a system that is operating under normal conditions.
Suppose that the evolution of a given system is determined by the following stochastic differential equation (SDE): (1) where represents the initial time and state. Typically, the objective is to find a control input such that the system (1) with input satisfies a given set of performance specifications; for example, certain specifications on the minimum rise time, constraints on the maximum overshoot, etc., may need to be satisfied. In recent years, many control methodologies (e.g., proportional-integrator-differentiator (PID), linear-quadratic-regulator (LQR), and , just to name a few) have been proposed as alternative techniques for finding controllers, each having its own advantages, disadvantages X. Y. Zhou is with the Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong (e-mail: xyzhou@se.cuhk.edu.hk).
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and characteristics. However, we emphasize that irrespective of the methodology used to come up with a given controller, the controller is designed as the input for the system (1) and for this reason, the same set of performance specifications are used to evaluate whether or not it is suitable. For example, suppose we have two controllers and such that minimizes an norm while minimizes an norm. When evaluating and and comparing their performance, the crucial issue is the behavior of the system (1) under each input; that is, both controllers are tested on the same system (1) and evaluated according to how well the original performance criteria are met (e.g., "Does it satisfy the rise time specifications?" and "Does it meet the constraints on maximum overshoot?" etc.), and not the cost functions (e.g., or ) that may have been used to determine it.
If the system being controlled is not too complicated, then finding a controller which satisfies all of the specifications is reasonably straightforward. For example, if (1) is a linear, single-input-single-output (SISO), infinite-horizon, time-invariant system, then, engineering insight together with numerical techniques arising from optimization theory (see [3] and [28] ) can be used to tune the parameters. However, things may not be so easy when dealing with more complex systems (e.g., nonlinear, time-varying, stochastic). In this case, the following simplifications are made. Rather than introducing a set of performance specifications, one assumes that all performance specifications are summarized by a single performance measure (2) and the following convention is adopted: a controller which makes (2) small satisfies the performance specifications better than controllers that makes (2) large. That is, the set of performance specifications is replaced by a single performance measure and, as in the classical case, all controllers, irrespective of how they are determined, are evaluated using the same performance measure (2) .
The risk-sensitive methodology using the exponential utility function is one approach to finding robust controllers for the system (1) [with performance measure (2) ]. Such controllers are obtained by minimizing criteria of the form (3) Again, we emphasize that the performance of the optimal exponential controller
[which minimizes (3) ] is evaluated using 0018-9286/01$10.00 © 2001 IEEE the cost functional (2): it is "good" if (2) is small, and "bad" if (2) is large. One limitation of the exponential approach is that optimal risk-sensitive controllers, while being robust, may result in poor performance under normal conditions. The simplest explanation for this is that the exponential utility emphasizes the large values of the (random) exponent (4) thus greatly amplifying the contribution of the large values of (4) in the cost (3). That is, optimal exponential controllers are conservative in that they are designed so that the largest (or "worst case") values of (4), should they occur, are kept small. For this reason, however, the performance of the optimal exponential controller in a "less than worst case" environment (which often corresponds to "normal conditions") may not be satisfactory. Alternatively, one can look at the close relationship between exponential risk-sensitive control and the so-called approach to robust control; see [22] . controllers are designed to perform well in a "worst case disturbances" environment. Consequently, optimal controllers (and therefore, optimal risk-sensitive controllers) may perform poorly, according to (2) , in normal conditions.
In this paper, we study certain issues related to the performance and robustness of controllers obtained by minimizing the HARA utility of the cost. In particular, for the system (1) with performance measure (2), the HARA cost functional is given by (5) where is a parameter. Since the HARA utility function is of polynomial rather than exponential order, the resulting controllers should be still robust but less risk-averse than optimal exponential controllers. For this reason, HARA controllers may perform better in normal conditions that optimal exponential controllers which are obtained by minimizing (3) . While this remains to be verified conclusively, certain weaker, though related, comparisons between the value functions of the HARA and exponential problems are obtained in this paper. In particular, we show how this may be viewed, in some sense, as a comparison between the guaranteed performance of HARA controllers and exponential controllers. In addition, we show that the HARA problem is equivalent to a class of stochastic differential games which are characterized by a cost function that contains a logarithmic term that acts like a weight on different components of the cost. We argue that the logarithmic term in the cost may be viewed as making the disturbance player less aggressive; that is, the (HARA) controller is designed in a "less than worst case" environment. This is consistent with the intuition that HARA controllers may perform better than exponential controllers when operating in normal conditions. In addition, the asymptotic properties (small noise limits) of the HARA problem and the associated differential game are also studied.
Our results on the relationship between the HARA problem and differential games as well as the asymptotic properties of the HARA problem are in line with those presented in [22] for the exponential-of-an-integral problem. However, there are certain differences which we wish to point out. In this paper, we consider a broader class of nonlinear systems. In particular, our results apply to systems in which the diffusion term may be control dependent and/or degenerate, and the drift term may depend nonlinearly on the control. (In fact, our analysis can be modified to obtain parallel results for the exponential case for the same class of nonlinear systems that we study in this paper.) These results are obtained using results from nonsmooth analysis and viscosity solutions. The inclusion of systems with control dependent diffusions in our analysis has particular relevance to finance applications; see [16] , [18] , [25] , [32] .
On the other hand, the robust control literature has centered, by and large, around the exponential utility function. This is due to its relationship to differential games and control; see [5] , [22] . However, the HARA utility function and its associated differential game are alternatives that should be kept in mind, especially when exponential and controllers are found to be too conservative.
Interestingly, the HARA utility function has been used in several optimal control formulations of problems in mathematical finance. For example, the problem of long term investment is formulated in [18] as an ergodic control problem where the cost functional involves the HARA utility of wealth. In [13] , the integral, over time, of the (discounted) HARA utility of consumption is used as a measure of total consumption (that is to be maximized). For recent work in mathematical finance which uses the exponential utility function, we refer the reader to the papers [6] , [7] .
We also note that the classical investment problem of maximizing the expected (HARA) utility of terminal wealth is studied in [16] . The lower value of a certain differential game is identified as the large deviation rate of the associated value function. It should be noted however that the analysis in [16] relies heavily on the unique structure associated with the finance application; in particular, the state is scalar, the dynamics are linear in the state, there is no running cost and the terminal cost is linear. The asymptotic results in [16] depend on these assumptions being satisfied. On the other hand, the focus of this paper is the performance comparison between HARA controllers and exponential controllers for which we adopt the standard assumptions from the risk-sensitive literature. Note however that these standard assumptions require the drift, diffusion, running and terminal costs to be uniformly bounded. That is, the asymptotic results in this paper do not cover those in [16] , and vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the HARA optimal control problem and present the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. In Section III, we introduce a class of differential games which are related to the problem of finding robust controllers and in Section IV, we show the equivalence between the HARA problem and this family of differential games. In Section V, we study the small noise asymptotic properties of the HARA problem. In Section VI, we obtain certain comparisons between the value function of the HARA problem and that of the exponential problem. This may be interpreted, in some sense, as a comparison between the guaranteed performance of HARA controllers and exponential controllers. In Section VII, we examine the LQR case of the HARA problem. This example is interesting because it exhibits a relationship between robustness and uncertainty. In particular, we show that the problem of finding a robust controller is equivalent to solving an LQR problem with a larger noise intensity. In Section VIII, we end with some concluding remarks. For the convenience of the reader, we have summarized in the Appendix some key results from the theories of viscosity solutions and nonsmooth analysis which are used in the paper.
II. HARA STOCHASTIC OPTIMAL CONTROL
In this section, we introduce the HARA control problem. Suppose that is fixed, is a filtered probability space, and an -valued standard Brownian motion defined on this space. Suppose that and are given. We consider systems with dynamics given by the following SDE: (6) In this equation, is a -valued process, referred to as the control input. (The precise definition of admissible controls will be given later.) The associated cost functional is given by (7) where is the solution of the SDE (6) 
Remark II.1: The assumption that is nonnegative and is uniformly positive (i.e., ) is required for the HARA utility function to be well defined. The remaining assumptions in (A1) and (A2) (and in particular, that of uniform boundedness) are standard; see [5] , [22] for risk-sensitive control and [20] for differential games. On the other hand, under the assumption of uniform boundedness, the additional requirement 1 A Polish space is a separable complete metric space.
that and are nonnegative/uniformly positive is not restrictive. More precisely, recall that our basic aim is to find a controller for the system (1). If is not nonnegative or is not uniformly positive, we can replace and/or by and for some sufficiently large constant and then use the performance measure instead of (2), to evaluate the performance of any given controller. Clearly (2) and are equivalent and (due the assumption of uniform boundedness) can be chosen so that and satisfy the required conditions. In particular, a risk-averse controller with performance measured by [or equivalently by (2)] can now be obtained by minimizing the HARA cost (7) with and replaced by and .
In order to study (6) and (7) using dynamic programming, we introduce the following controlled SDE and cost functional, of which (6) and (7) are a special case. Let , where is the constant in (A2). For every , consider the following SDE:
and cost functional (10) Note in particular that since , is nonnegative, , and and are uniformly bounded [see (A2)], there is a constant such that (11) Therefore, (which is required if we are to use the HARA utility function) and the cost (10) is well defined.
Clearly, (6) and (7) corresponds to the special case of (9) and (10) when . The class of admissible controls (in the weak formulation; see [30, Ch. 2] ) is the set of 5-tuples which satisfy the following properties : 1) is a complete probability space; 2)
is a -dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on over , and is augmented by all the -null sets in ; 3)
is an -progressively measurable process on ; 4) Under , for any initial condition , the SDE (9) admits a unique weak solution on .
If it is clear from the context what and are, we will write as shorthand for 5-tuple . Assumptions (A1) and (A2) guarantee the existence of a unique weak solution of the SDE (9), for every admissible control . Furthermore, the cost functional (10) is well defined for every and . The value function associated with (9) and (10) (12) is well defined [30] , and has a positive lower bound.
The HJB equation associated with (9) and (10) is tr (13) We have the following result. Theorem II.1: Assume that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then, the value function , as defined by (12), is the unique viscosity solution of (13) .
Proof: Following the proof in [19, Sec.V3 and V9], it can be shown that is a viscosity solution of (13) . (Note that in this proof, continuity of is all that is assumed.) However, for the uniqueness we cannot immediately apply the results in [19] since the terminal condition of (13) is unbounded due to the presence of . To get around this, we follow a technique in [27] and consider the following transformation:
where . Then, (13) becomes tr This equation has a uniformly bounded terminal condition and, hence, admits at most one viscosity solution. It follows then that (12) is the unique viscosity solution of (13).
III. DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
In this section, we introduce a class of differential games which can be used to find robust controllers.
A. General Formulation
We shall follow the Elliott-Kalton formulation of two-player, zero-sum differential games [15] , [20] , [22] , a summary of which is as follows. Suppose that is given and fixed. Let be a fixed filtered probability space, and a fixed -valued standard Brownian motion on this space. Assume that is augmented with all the -null sets of . Suppose that the system dynamics are governed by the following SDE: (14) where is the -valued input of player 1 (the control player), and is the -valued input of player 2 (the disturbance player, or opponent). The cost functional is given by (15) 1) Admissible Inputs: The set of admissible controls for player 1 is is -progressively measurable (16) For any , two admissible inputs , are said to be equivalent on if a.e. on , -a.s. We shall denote this by on . The set of admissible disturbances for player 2 is is -progressively measurable and (14) has a unique solution (17) As in the case of admissible controls, we consider two admissible disturbances as being equivalent on (for a given ) if a.e. on , -a.s., and denote this by on . In the deterministic case (i.e., ), the class of admissible controls/disturbances is given by 2) Admissible Strategies: The class of admissible strategies for player 2 is for every on on (18) Similarly, the class of admissible strategies for player 1 is for every on on (19) In the deterministic case, the admissible strategies of players 1 and 2 (denoted by and , respectively), are defined in the obvious manner.
3) Upper/Lower Differential Games: The upper stochastic differential game associated with (14) and (15) can be stated as follows: Find such that (20) is commonly referred to as the upper value of the stochastic differential game (14) and (15) .
The lower stochastic differential game associated with (14) and (15) can be stated as follows: Find such that (21) is commonly referred to as the lower value of the (stochastic) differential game (14) and (15) .
It is well known that on (see [4] , [20] ). On the other hand, the differential game (14) and (15) is said to have value if . Upper and lower deterministic differential games are defined analogously.
4) Isaacs Equations:
A summary of basic definitions and results from the theory of viscosity solutions can be found in the Appendix.
Under certain assumptions, it can be shown that is the unique viscosity solution of the upper Isaacs equation (22) while is the unique viscosity solution of the lower Isaacs equation (23) where tr and tr (In the next section, we shall present assumptions which guarantee existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions for the class of problems which we are studying.) In the deterministic case, the upper and lower Isaacs equations are given by (22) and (23), with . A sufficient condition for the existence of value in (14) and (15) is the so-called Isaacs (or min-max) condition (24) Under this assumption, the existence of value follows immediately from the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of (22) and (23) . (For further details about the Isaacs equation, the reader is directed to [20] for the stochastic case, and [4] for the deterministic case.)
B. A Class of Differential Games
Let be a filtered probability space and a standard -valued Brownian motion, as discussed in Section III-A. Let and be given and fixed. Consider the following special case of (14): (25) where the inputs of player 1 and of player 2 satisfy and . We consider cost functionals of the following form: (26) We assume throughout this section that (A2) holds. In certain places, we shall replace (A1) by the following.
Assumption: (A1)′ and are compact, and . In order to study (25) and (26) using dynamic programming, we follow the same procedure that we used for the HARA problem (Section II) by considering the following related differential game. Let be fixed, where is the constant in (A2), and . Consider the SDE (27) with cost (28) Using the same argument for (28) as for (11), it can be seen that for every , there is a constant , independent of , such that for all and . In addition, when is compact by (A1)′, it follows that there is a constant , which is independent of , such that (29) for all and . The upper Isaacs equation associated with (27) and (28) (31) is the unique viscosity solution of (30) .
Proof: Following the arguments in [20] , it can be shown that (31) is a viscosity solution of (30) . As in the case of Theorem II.1, we can not immediately use the results in [20] to obtain uniqueness since the terminal condition in (30) is unbounded. To get around this, consider the following transformation:
where . Following the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem II.1, we conclude that (30) has at most one viscosity solution.
It follows from Theorem III.1 that the upper value of the stochastic differential game (27) and (28) is the unique viscosity solution of (30) . The deterministic differential game (25) and (26) [respectively, (27) and (28)] is the special case of (25) and (26) [respectively, (27) and (28) (32) is the unique viscosity solution of the upper Isaacs equation (30) with . Proof: Following the same arguments in [4] , it can be shown that (32) is a viscosity solution of (30) (with ). Uniqueness is shown using the same techniques as in Theorem III.1.
Clearly, (32) is the upper value of the deterministic differential game (27) and (28) with .
IV. HARA PROBLEMS AND DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
In this section, we show that (under certain conditions) the HARA problem (9) and (10) is equivalent to the stochastic differential game (27) and (28) .
Consider the following transformation:
Note that by (10)- (12) , is well defined [since ] and (34) Since is the unique viscosity solution of (13) [20] . In order to establish the equivalence between the HARA problem and the stochastic differential game, we need Proposition IV.1, which gives conditions under which may be considered as being compact. The proof of Proposition IV.1 depends on the following assumption.
Assumption: (A3)
, and , and are differentiable in . Proposition IV.1: Suppose that and Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Let be the unique viscosity solution of (30) . Suppose that , and and , the super and subdifferentials of , respectively, be defined as in (94) and (95) Theorem IV.1: Suppose that Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Let be fixed, and be the unique viscosity solution of (13) . Then is the unique viscosity solution of (35). Moreover, there exists a compact subset which is independent of such that has the representation (45) where is defined by (16) , by (18) via (17), and with being the solution of (27) 
Moreover, the maximizing in (47) is given by
Since and are uniformly bounded on and respectively [see (A2) and Proposition IV.1], it follows that for some compact , which is independent of . Therefore, we may replace by in (47), for any compact (with ), and the maximizing in (47) will still be given by (48) and is still a super-solution of (47). It is easy to see that the same argument applies for the case of sub-solutions and hence, under the constraint , is still the unique viscosity solution of (35). However, under the constraint that , it follows from Theorem III.1 that the unique viscosity solution of (35) is the upper value of a stochastic differential game, as defined by the right hand side of (45). Hence, we have equality in (45).
Remark IV.1: It is clear from the proof of Theorem IV.1 that we may choose to be a closed ball in , centered at the origin, of sufficiently large radius; that is, , for some . In particular, this guarantees that , which simplifies some of the analysis in Section VI-B.
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
For the remainder of this paper, for any given , we shall denote the value function of the HARA problem (9) and (10), as defined by (12) , by , and . A similar comment applies to the upper value of the differential game (27) and (28) when . In the deterministic case of (27) and (28) with , we continue to use . We have shown that under Assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3) with , the HARA problem (9) and (10) is equivalent to a stochastic differential game of the form (27) and (28); see Theorem IV.1. In this section, we study the asymptotic properties of and as . We prove that and hence [under (A1), (A2) and (A3)] when . This reveals a relationship between the HARA problem and the deterministic differential game.
Our convergence proof follows the general methods of Barles and Perthame [2] . In particular, the notion of solution that is used in this approach is the generalized definition of a discontinuous viscosity solution. This is required since the functions (49) and (51) below are only semi-continuous in general. In addition, the proof uses a comparison theorem for semi-continuous viscosity sub-and super-solutions. The definition of a discontinuous viscosity solution is quite similar to that of a continuous solution. The reader should refer to [19, Ch . VII] for a detailed account of the Barles and Perthame method. The definition of a discontinuous viscosity solution as well as the comparison theorem for semi-continuous sub and supersolutions can also be found there.
We begin with the following asymptotic result for . Proposition V.1: Suppose that (A1)′ and (A2) hold. Let and be the upper values of the stochastic and deterministic cases of the differential game (27) and (28), respectively. Then uniformly on compact subsets.
Proof: Define
for all . In view of (29), is uniformly bounded when and belong to compact subsets. Therefore, is well defined and upper semicontinuous. We now show that is a viscosity subsolution of (30) . Therefore, is a continuous viscosity solution of (30) (with ) and uniformly on compact subsets. Since the upper-value of the deterministic case of the differential game (27) and (28) is the unique viscosity solution of (30) with (see Theorem III.2), it follows that . The following result relates the HARA problem (9) and (10) and the deterministic case of the differential game (27) and (28) .
Theorem V.1: Suppose that (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. For every , let be the value function of the HARA problem (9) and (10), and be the compact set from Theorem IV.1. Suppose that is the upper value of the deterministic differential game (27) and (28) associated with . Then, and are the unique viscosity solutions of (30) (with ) and (35), respectively. Moreover uniformly on compact subsets.
Proof: It follows from Theorems III.2 and IV.1 that and are the unique viscosity solutions of (30) (with ) and (35), respectively. By Theorems III.1 and IV.1, is also the unique viscosity solution of (30) with being the -independent compact set determined by Theorem IV.1. The convergence result then follows from Proposition V.1.
In [22] , there is a similar asymptotic result for the exponential risk-sensitive cost. However, stronger assumptions than Assumptions (A1), (A2), and (A3) are made. In particular, nondegeneracy of is assumed, which guarantees the existence of classical solutions to the HJB equation associated with the -parametrized risk-sensitive problems, whereas Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) only guarantee the existence of viscosity solutions of (13) . As can be seen from the proof of Theorem V.1, having classical solutions is not a fundamental requirement for the result to hold.
VI. COMPARISONS

A. HARA Controllers
In Section II, we introduced the HARA utility function as an alternative to the exponential utility approach to finding robust controllers. Intuitively, we expect the HARA approach to give robust controllers that have superior performance characteristics to exponential controllers. A conclusive proof of this statement remains an open problem. In this section, we obtain some relationships between the value function of the HARA problem and that of the exponential problem. Using this result, a weaker statement about the performance of HARA controllers and exponential controllers can be made.
Suppose once again that the system dynamics are given by the following SDE: (52) and that the performance of a particular control is measured by the following cost functional:
(53) Let be given. The exponential risk-sensitive performance measure associated with the system (52) for a given is (54) and the associated value function is defined by (55)
One method of obtaining robust controllers for the system (52) [with the performance measure (53)] is to solve the exponential risk-sensitive problem (52), (54) for the optimal exponential risk-sensitive controller , and to use in the system (52). The performance of (52) with is measured by . On the other hand, an immediate consequence of Jensen's inequality [8] , [30] (61) is simply for the sake of convenience and Theorem VI.1 can be extended to cover the case when (61) (and nonnegativity/uniform positivity of and ) is not satisfied; see also Remark II.1. In particular, uniform boundedness (A2) implies that (61) is satisfied by and for sufficiently large . Denoting (63) one can easily see that is the least upper bound associated with the HARA problem (63) for the original performance measure (53), while , as defined by (55), is the least upper bound for the original performance measure associated with the exponential approach. Theorem VI.1 can now be applied from which we conclude that . Therefore, the HARA approach and the inequality (62) can be extended to the general case when (61) We obtain (62) by taking on both sides of (67) and noting the definitions (55) and (60). On the other hand, if , then is convex on and ; see (A2). Therefore, we can apply Jensen's inequality again to obtain (66), (67) and our result (62).
B. Deterministic Differential Games
In this section, we turn our attention to the deterministic system (72) is the introduction of the term. To get a feel for the role that this term plays, consider a situation where the first player chooses an input and applies this input to (70) and (71) and then to (70), (72). In the first case, the opponent chooses an input to maximize the cost (71) corresponding to this . This corresponds to the standard approach to robust control. In the second situation, the term acts like a weight between the two components of the cost. In particular, the term reduces the importance of the first component relative to second component in the optimization of the opponent player. For this reason, one expects the input of the opponent chosen by maximizing (72) will be less "aggressive" than the input of the opponent player chosen by maximizing (71). That is, the first player in (72) is dealing with a more conservative opponent than the first player in (71). For this reason, we expect the controller obtained by solving (70), (72) to be robust, but at the same time, to have better performance [as measured by (69)] than the controller obtained by solving (70) and (71). In Theorem IV.1, it is shown that under (A1), (A2), and (A3), for every , the HARA problem is related to a differential game of the form (70), (72), in which the input of player 2 is restricted to , an -independent closed ball in of radius ; see Remark VI.1. Similarly, it is shown in [22] that the exponential-of-an-integral problem is related to a differential game of the form (70) and (71) in which, as in the HARA case, the input of player 2 may be restricted to a closed, -independent ball in , . Throughout this section, we shall assume that for both (70) and (71) and (70), (72), where is fixed. Suppose that is given. Since the strategy which satisfies is admissible, we have the following inequality: (73) where on the left-hand side of (73) is an admissible pair for (68), and on the right-hand side of (73) is an admissible 3-tuple for (70).
For (73), it can be seen that for any controller is an upper bound on the performance of the system (68) under , where performance is measured by . Clearly, the right-hand side in (73) is minimized by (74) the upper value of (70) and (71).
Similarly, it is easy to see that (75) where, as before, on the left-hand side of (75) is an admissible pair for (68), while on the right-hand side of (75) is admissible for (70); that is is an upper bound on , which is minimized, over , by (76) the upper value of (70) and (72). Clearly where is the upper value of the deterministic case of the differential game (27) and (28) , as defined by (32) .
Our next result shows the relationship between and . Theorem VI.2: Suppose (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold. Let be given, as discussed above, the upper value of (70) and (71) as defined by (74) and , the upper value of (70), (72) , and that is given and fixed. In particular, it should be noted that the model (77) (with scalar state, but a multivariable control) is one that arises quite frequently in financial applications; see [16] , [18] , [32] for an example of this.
Suppose that . Then, (77) is a deterministic problem with a nonnegative infimal cost and hence is well posed. However, this infimal cost in general can not be achieved. For example, when is controllable, the infimal cost is zero, but is not achievable. In this situation, we must be satisfied with near-optimal controls. (For a discussion on near-optimal controls for infinite-time singular LQR problems, refer to the paper [29] .) In particular, we can make the cost arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing a "sufficiently large" control. When , (77) is a well-posed stochastic problem, and the optimal cost is achieved by a unique optimal control. In this case, the value function involves the solution of the so-called stochastic Riccati equation, the properties of which are studied in [9] . The fundamental difference between the case and is the role that the uncertainty plays. The reader is directed to [9] for a deeper discussion of this and other related issues.
The HJB equation associated with (77) is (78) It is easy to show that the unique solution of (78) (77) is (81) We also note that for the LQR problem with exponential utility, it seems that there is no closed-form expression for the optimal control when the control appears in the diffusion (which is the case in many finance applications). In fact, for this particular problem, the issue of existence and uniqueness of solutions of the associated HJB equation is still an open question.
2) Stochastic LQR Problem: Consider the following stochastic LQR problem:
It is easy to show (see [9] ) that (83) is the value function associated with (82), where is determined by (80), and (81) is the optimal control. This shows an equivalence between the HARA problem (77) and the stochastic LQR problem (82). In particular, the -parameter in the cost (77) has been transferred to the state equation (82).
3) Discussion: The equivalence between (77) and (82) shows an interesting relationship between uncertainty and robustness. Suppose that under "normal" conditions, the dynamics are given by the system (84)
In addition, suppose that the performance of any given controller is measured by the cost functional:
As stated in the Introduction, the cost functional (85) 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied some of the properties of optimal HARA controllers. Our study of the HARA problem was motivated by the belief that in addition to being robust, optimal HARA controllers are less conservative than optimal exponential controllers. We have shown that the HARA problem is equivalent to a certain stochastic differential game, different from the one commonly encountered in the robust control literature, and have studied the asymptotic properties of both the HARA problem and the associated game problem. One feature of this differential game is that it involves a logarithmic term which acts like a weight for the different components of the cost. We have argued that this weighting has the effect of making the opposing (disturbance) player less aggressive; that is, the controller in the logarithmic-weighted game (i.e., the HARA controller) is designed in a "less than worst case" environment. This is consistent with the intuition that HARA controllers, while being robust, may perform better than exponential controllers (which are designed in a "worst case environment") when applied to a system operating under normal situations. While conclusive theoretical justification of this intuition remains an important open question, certain related, though weaker, comparisons between the value functions of the HARA exponential problems have been obtained in this paper. Another important issue that we have not addressed relates to the robustness/disturbance attenuation properties of the HARA controller, especially when compared to those of the exponential controller; see [17] for related analysis for the exponential problem. As an example, we examined a particular linear-quadratic case of the HARA problem. For this problem, we showed that finding a robust controller for a certain class of linear systems with a quadratic terminal cost is equivalent to solving a linear-quadratic problem of the same form, but with a larger noise intensity. This shows an interesting relationship between robustness and uncertainty.
APPENDIX
We present here some basic definitions and results from the theory of viscosity solutions and nonsmooth analysis which are referred to in this paper. For a detailed discussion of viscosity solutions, the reader is referred to [11] and [12] , as well as [1] , [19] , and [30] . For a discussion of nonsmooth analysis, we recommend [10] . A proof of the relationship between sub/superdifferentials and Clarke's generalized gradient can be found in [30] and [31] .
A. Viscosity Solutions
Consider the following nonlinear, scalar, first-order PDE (87) [a special case of which is (30) with ], and the nonlinear, scalar second-order PDE (88) It is well known that the upper/lower Isaacs equations (22) and (23) , which are special cases of (88), do not, in general, have classical (smooth) solutions. A generalized concept of solution, called a viscosity solution, is introduced in [12] . The main result in [12] is that under certain mild conditions, there exists a unique viscosity solution of (87). In the second-order case, uniqueness is proven in [21] , [23] . The definition of a viscosity solution of the first-order PDE (87) 
B. Nonsmooth Analysis
The following results from nonsmooth analysis are used in our proof of Proposition IV.1. For an in depth discussion, we recommend the book [10] .
We begin with a definition of the generalized gradient. 
